ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Transitory and emerging economics (TEEs) have experienced a surge of awareness for and attention paid to corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues in the past decade. For example, China supplied more delegates than any other country to the 2007 International Leaders" Summit of the UN Global Compact (Waddock, 2008) . As of 2009, Chinese firms were issuing over 15% of the world"s CSR reports, but there is significant variation across Chinese firms in the amount of information disclosed on specific CSR activities (China WTO Tribune, 2009 ). Simultaneously, institutional investment, especially from foreign investors, has increased in TEEs. Prior studies (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 1994; Cox, Brammer and Williamton, 2004) China provides a unique context for investigating the aforementioned research questions because endogeneity is of less concern, a unique rating for firms" voluntary CSP is available, and institutional investment has experienced explosive development. First, endogeneity is of relatively lower concern in our study. Institutional investors in China, as minority shareholders, are passive investors (Yuan et al., 2009) Insurance companies and social security funds prefer firms that look after their customers.
Last but not least, we provide empirical evidence on the impact of "surprises" in firms"
voluntary CSP, on institutional investment, by innovatively splitting a firm"s voluntary CSP into two components -expected and unexpected. The unexpected voluntary CSP contains information surprises to institutional investors, whereas expected CSP can be explained by other firm characteristics. Institutional investors in general, and mutual funds and QFIIs in particular, hold a high percentage of shareholdings in firms with surprisingly superior voluntary CSP that cannot be explained by corporate governance, ownership structure and other firm characteristics. However, only mutual funds are likely to increase their investment in firms with voluntary CSP surprises.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the institutional background on CSR reporting and institutional investment in China; Section 3 reviews relevant literature and develops hypotheses; Section 4 illustrates the research design; Section 5 explains the sample selection and data collection; Sections 6 and 7 report the main empirical analyses and further tests, respectively; Section 8 discusses our findings and concludes the paper.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The CSR concept was introduced to the Chinese equity market in 2006. After the issuance of the SHSE and CMC guidelines, CSR reporting became mandatory for most of the large listed firms in China. The SHSE imposed the CSR requirement on three types of its listed firms -about 300 constituent firms of the "Corporate Governance Index", financial firms, and firms with overseas listed shares. Meanwhile, the SZSE imposed the CSR requirement on firms included in the SZSE 100 index. As such, about 400-500 of the largest listed firms on the Chinese stock market have to comply with the CSR requirement.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Extant literature suggests that institutional investors prefer investing in firms with superior CSP, in developed economies. Early work by Coffey and Fryxell (1991) and Graves and Waddock (1994) shows that the number of institutional investors is positively related to a firm"s social performance, within a model that draws on the efficient markets theory (Fama, 1970) . However, the positive impact of firms" CSP on institutional investment in developed economies evidenced in the prior literature may be shadowed by an endogeneity concern.
Institutional investors control the majority of the share value in developed countries and their attitude toward CSR could be both effect and cause -a measure of how seriously CSR is taken and a powerful signal to other investors about their views (Aguilera, Williams, Conley and Rupp, 2006) . Institutional investors have incentives to actively monitor firm management (Pound, 1988; Shleifer and Vishney, 1986) , play a role in encouraging and promoting CSR disclosures (Solomon, Solomon and Norton, 2002) , and aim to enhance CSR via active ownership (Gifford, 2010).
iii As mentioned above, the endogeneity is less of a concern in China. Hence, we examine whether firms" CSP attracts institutional investment in this specific research context.
We argue that institutional investors" preference for firms with superior voluntary CSP can be explained by two benefits brought by firms" voluntary CSR disclosure -reduced information asymmetry and enhanced social capital.
Firms" CSP generally provides benefits to investors by reducing the information asymmetry in equity markets (Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr, 2013) , reflecting managers" ethical concerns and driving transparent and reliable financial reporting (Kim, Park and Wier, 2012) . voluntary CSR disclosure and their access to capital (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2013) .
Voluntary and transparent reporting by firms reduces information asymmetry between the firm and its investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007 (Paldam, 2000) has been investigated prevalently, in terms of relation networks (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988 Coleman, , 1990 , trust and reciprocity norms (Putnam, 1993) , and relational competences (Araujo and Easton, 1999 
H3b: Long-term institutional investors (insurance companies and social security funds) are likely to increase their investment in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings.
Foreign institutional investors were restricted from investing directly in the Chinese stock market in the past. Since 2002, the Chinese government has permitted QFIIs to invest in its securities market (Zhang, 2001; Greenaway, Guariglia, and Yu, 2011) . The QFII scheme represents a significant departure from China"s traditional approach of strict capital controls.
Foreign institutional investors only qualify if they had no less than USD 10 billion securities assets in the previous financial year and meet other stringent criteria that vary for different business types. For example, commercial banks have to be ranked among the world"s top 100
banks, fund management companies should have five years of operational experience, whereas insurance and securities firms should have 30 years of operational experience with paid-up capital of at least USD 1 billion.
The QFII programme is closely scrutinised by the Chinese government, and the securities investment activities of QFIIs are regulated by the CSRC and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The CSRC has the right to decide which foreign investors qualify for the programme. The QFII programme does not allow for unrestricted repatriation of funds and requires a minimum lock-in period of one year, which extends to three years for closed-end funds. During the lock-in period, the funds remitted into
China by the QFII must be held by custodians in a special-purpose RMB account. The total amount that QFIIs can invest in a single listed company, individually or collectively, is restricted by investment quotas, set by SAFE. The list of approved QFIIs and their combined and individual investment quotas are frequently updated by the CSRC and SAFE. Currently, the amount of available shares falls short of demand, and a QFII is never assured of getting an allocation in any event.
The QFII scheme is expected to lead to market-driven improvements in corporate governance in China, as QFIIs are all large international institutions from major developed countries, for example, the US, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Liu et al., 2014) . QFIIs may prefer firms with more voluntary CSR disclosure or better corporate governance, in China, as they do in developed markets. Using equity holdings from 27 countries, Ferreira and Matos (2008) 
H4b: QFIIs are likely to increase their investment in firms with high voluntary CSP ratings.
We empirically test the above-developed hypotheses with a set of control variables for ownership structure, corporate governance, compensation and other firm characteristics that may determine the institutional investment in our sample firms. The ownership structure of Chinese listed firms is characterised by a high proportion of SOEs, which may have an impact on the link between institutional investment and firms" voluntary CSP. A majority of managers see corporate governance as a necessary pillar for sustainable CSR in developing countries (Jamali, Safieddine and Rabbath, 2008) . Corporate governance can positively moderate the association between corporate financial performance and CSR (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013) . Multiple configurations of corporate governance mechanisms interact and combine to impact firms" CSR behaviour (Jain and Jamali, 2016). Executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning the interests of the firm manager and investors, resulting in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Kane, 2002; Zalewski, 2003) .
RESEARCH METHODS
We developed several multivariate regression models to test H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4a developed in the previous section and identify the relationship between voluntary CSP and institutional investment in China.
( 1) where 
where the variables are defined similarly to those in model (1) and , ).
The other approach is more sophisticatedly designed to reflect the nature of the institutional investor, who may be able to identify investee firms with unexpectedly good voluntary CSP. We split the voluntary CSP of firms into two components -expected and unexpected. The unexpected voluntary CSP contains information surprises to institutional investors. We developed the following two-stage model:
Where, is the regression error in the first-stage regression. In the second-stage regression, CSP Surprise t is the estimated residual ( ) from the linear regression for the voluntary CSP of the sample firms in year t; the other variables are defined in the same way as in the previous models.
In the first-stage equation of model (3) 
where all variables are defined as in the previous models.
The first-stage equation of model (5) The correlation results show that only investments by institutional investors (IO t ) and mutual funds (MF t ) are highly correlated, at 0.85 with a 1% significance level. Since we analyse these two variables separately, there is no concern over multicollinearity in our regression analyses. Table 3 institutional investors from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance in their investee companies abroad. However, based on our empirical evidence, it seems that the Chinese government"s hope that these reputable foreign institutional investors might improve the corporate governance of Chinese firms is not being met.
EMPIRICAL TESTS
The regression results for model (2) reported in Table 4 are generally consistent with those reported in Table 3 . Institutional investors in general hold high levels of shareholdings in the subsequent year, in firms with superior voluntary CSP in the current year. Mutual funds and QFIIs in particular determine this investment pattern of institutional investors. The results for other control variables are largely consistent with those reported in Table 3 , with a few exceptions. For instance, long-term institutional investors invest less in SOEs.
Institutional investors, especially mutual funds, do not make large equity investments in firms with large sizes of management teams. Moreover, we observe that institutional investors in general, and mutual funds in particular, invest more in firms with more managerial ownership, consistent with the argument in prior literature that managerial ownership suggests an alignment between the interests of managers and investors. Institutional investors perceive managerial ownership as an efficient corporate governance mechanism in TEEs such as China. Furthermore, the positive association between institutional investment and managerial ownership may reflect the trust between institutional investors and firm managers, which may also lead to a positive link between institutional investment and managerial salaries. Mutual funds invest more in firms whose managers and directors are well paid. Table 4 .
We now move on to testing whether institutional investors are likely to increase their investment in firms with superior voluntary CSP. Table 6 reports regression results for model However, other types of institutional investors may not increase their investment in firms with superior voluntary CSP, and some institutional investors with short-term investment horizons may even sell shares in these firms for transient profits. This may be a plausible explanation for the finding of an insignificant link between the likelihood of increased aggregate institutional ownership and firms" voluntary CSP. Our H1b is therefore rejected based on the empirical evidence in Table 6 . As for the other variables, increases in financial leverage and stock market performance significantly enhance the likelihood of investment by mutual funds.
Alternatively, we test the likelihood that institutional investors increase their investment in firms with voluntary CSP surprises. Table 6 .
FURTHER ANALYSES
According to Panel A of Table 1 , the aggregate institutional ownership is about 21-26% in 2007 and 2008. The shareholdings of most of the institutional investors are lower than 5%, a common threshold used in previous studies (Chung et al., 2002; Dechow et al., 1996) to identify institutional investors that play a significant role in constraining managerial discretion in the US. The influencing power of institutional investors with less than 5% ownership, over investee firms" CSP, is unlikely to be material unless they form a coalition.
However, according to Xi (2006) , the collective action problem and natural rivalry among institutional investors create barriers to co-operation.
Although we believe our empirical results are not affected by the reverse causality problem, we conduct 2SLS regressions to address the concern of a possible influence from institutional investors over firms" CSP. The ideal approach would be to employ an instrumental variable strategy to address the endogeneity concern. However, it is common in corporate governance research that the data do not provide plausible valid instruments This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
(Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). We notice that board gender diversity has a positive impact on the CSR ratings of Chinese firms (McGuinness, Vieito and Wang, 2017) but no significant impact on institutional investment has been evidenced in prior literature. As such we use board gender diversity as the instrumental variable in our 2SLS regressions to further address the endogeneity concern. The following 2SLS regression models were developed: (6) where FD t is the percentage of female directors on the board, and the other variables are defined as in models (1-5). Table 8 A good aggregate CSR rating will include a consistent range of important social issues that are uniformly measured across a wide range of companies (Graves and Waddock, 1994) . Carroll (1979) emphasises the fundamentally multidimensional nature of the CSR rating construct. Griffin and Mahon (1997) suggest that firms" CSP should be disaggregated into its individual components so as to avoid the information losses associated with aggregation into a single construct. Following this suggestion, we conduct further analyses on the eight constituent constructs of the SNAI CSR index that reflect specific dimensions of the overall CSR ratings of our sample firms.
As discussed earlier, the SNAI CSR index comprises data concerning eight criteria: environment, energy-saving, employees, equality, social, customers, stakeholders, and lawabiding/ ethics. We manually calculate the weighted sum of scores for each CSP criteria and use them to analyse whether and how institutional investors are related to the constituent components of firms" voluntary CSP.
We replace the independent variable (CSP) of model (2) with the voluntary CSP scores for each of the eight criteria to analyse associations between the eight criteria and different types of institutional investors. The regressions results are reported in Table 9 . Our further tests for the disaggregated voluntary CSP suggest that mutual funds invest more in firms achieving higher voluntary CSP with respect to equality and customers, but less in those doing well at saving energy. Again, the investment pattern of institutional investors in general is driven by mutual funds. Insurance companies and social security funds invest more in firms that take care of their customers. QFIIs are the only type of institutional investors that prefer investing in firms that achieve better CSP in terms of saving energy. The regression results for the other variables are the same as those reported in Table 4 .
We further replace the aggregate voluntary CSP in model (4) Table 6 . This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. i The fact that the voluntary CSP rating is only available for 2008 unfortunately prohibits us from analysing the effects of changes in the rating on institutional investment. Fortunately, this reduces the endogeneity concern in our study. In a scenario in which the voluntary CSP rating was available to the public in two continuous years (t and t+1), testing the impact of CSP t on changes in institutional investment would be complicated by the fact that institutional investors, as informed and sophisticated investors, would be able to predict voluntary CSP t+1 .
CONCLUSIONS
ii Institutional investment here includes investment from ordinary legal persons (normally state-owned enterprises) and non-financial corporations. In the present paper, ordinary legal persons and non-financial corporations are excluded from our definition of institutional investors.
iii Extant literature offers mixed evidence of institutional investors" effect on firms" CSR/CSP. Dam and Scholtens (2012) suggest that shareholdings by banks and institutional investors have no significant effect on European firms" CSR. Lopatta et al. (2017) find that bank ownership is positively related to CSR performance. iv The melamine contamination incident broke out on September 11, 2008, when Sanlu Co., one of China"s largest dairy manufacturers, announced that its products that were on sale, including infant formula, had been contaminated by melamine. Sanlu immediately recalled all its products from the market. Since melamine had been added to raw milk, consumers suspected that other brands" dairy products could potentially have been contaminated as well. The fear was confirmed two days later when products of 22 brands (with total market shares exceeding 90% in liquid milk and 50% in powdered milk) were found to contain melamine. Unfortunately, portfolio turnover data are not available for our sample firms. vii Securities companies function as investment banks and asset management companies in China. viii The voice approach commonly means voting against the management, where institutional investors monitor firm management. The exit approach is also called "voting with one"s feet" and refers to institutional investors choosing to liquidate their shareholdings in a firm. ix In January 2014, the CIRC started consulting with the public regarding its intention to lift the 25% cap to 30%, implying that the government was making an effort to encourage equity investment by long-term institutional investors such as insurance companies. Yugang Chen is a professor of finance at Business School, Sun Yat-sen University. His research interests range broadly in M&A, corporate governance, mutual fund, and wealth management.
